Applied Law: Causation
My client has not yet been charged. As such, he may currently be on pre-charge bail arrangements to facilitate the gathering of evidence by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The CPS is currently actively considering what charges to bring, if any. Once such a decision has been taken, the CPS will issue a summon to the address of my client stating the charges and arrangements regarding the date and place of appearance in court.
The range of charges the CPS may bring, if they do decide to press charges, varies from common assault under section 39 of The Criminal Justice act 1988, actual bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act (OAPA) 1861, grievous bodily harm (GBH) with intent or otherwise under section 18 and 20 respectively of the OAPA 1861, to manslaughter and finally murder under common law. Which of these charges is more likely and what that in turn may mean for my client regarding sentencing will be discussed later.
My client is 17, therefore a youth. As such his first appearance will be in the youth court division of magistrates. If the cps charges my client with assault or in any case charges for an offence which is no more serious than deserving a maximum of two years, there will be a summery trial in the youth court. Section 91 of the Criminal Court Sentencing Act 2000 states that my client may be detained longer if he is charged with 'certain grave crimes' - crimes for which an adult would be sentenced for 14 years or longer - such as grievous bodily harm with intent (GBH) or murder. In such circumstances, under section 24 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 my client may be sent to the Crown Court, under custody or conditional/unconditional bail, if there is a real possibility that he will be sentenced to more than two years, as established in R v Fairhurst (1986) 8 Cr. App. R. (S.) 346 and later upheld in R v Manchester Youth Court 2002. On the first appearance in the Crown Court my client will be asked to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty and there will be a case management hearing. If a plea of not guilty is entered, there will be a jury trial, otherwise my client will be sentenced.
The arrangements in the crown court following the case of T & V v. United Kingdom (2000) will be informal so as to conform with the requirement of section 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to a fair trial. If there is a trial it will be held in private with no members of the public allowed, however the press may be given audience but they may not publish the name of my client. Given my client's age there may be other arrangements to facilitate the full participation of my client with the procedures, his lawyer, etc. During the actual trial the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts and the culpability of my client. From henceforth maters of law will be contested from the defence with the jury giving a final verdict based on fact. My client is entitled to give evidence under oath in which case he is entitled to be cross examined.
What is clear from the facts is that my client hits the victim with a glass on the back of her neck. Following a chain of events the victim later dies. Based on such facts, it may be said that my client has no intention to kill the victim. Instead, my client may be charged with causing actual bodily harm. However due to my client’s use of a weapon (a glass), the cps may infer that my client intents to cause grievous bodily harm. As intention to cause grievous bodily harm satisfies the mens rea required for murder, the cps may bring charges for murder with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
However, in DPP v Majewski (1976) it was states that although intoxication is not a defence for crimes of basic intent, it is a defence for crimes of specific intent. The fact that my client was heavily intoxicated on the night in question therefore may be used as a defence to the specific crime of murder with intent to cause gbh and lower it to manslaughter which is a crime of basic intent.
For my client to be guilty of manslaughter however, a factual link must be established between my client's conduct and the end result. Furthermore, the act of hitting the victim must have been intentional, dangerous and unlawful, see DPP v Newbury [1972]. We do not know what occurred prior to the actions of my client, save the fact that there was an argument. Therefore, the full details of what occurred might show that my client's action was not intentional, hence perhaps be guilty of only assault. However, for the purpose of this advice I will assume that there was a basic intent on the part of my client. That the act was unlawful and dangerous may be considered undisputable.
After my client hits the victim with a glass on the back of her neck, she runs out of the club, past two doormen, into the road where she is hit by a dangerously speeding car. For the chain of causation to be broken and the victim's conduct to be considered as a nuovos actus intervenes, the conduct of the victim must be so 'daft' that no reasonable man could have foreseen. The reasonable man however needs to bear in mind the characteristics of the victim and that she may so act in the agony of the moment without thought or deliberation, see R v Roberts [1971].
Bearing in mind the facts of the case in question, it is safe to suggest that a reasonable man could foresee that the victim would try and get away from what she may have perceived as a threatening situation. In R v Corbett [1996] it was decided that it is foreseeable that the victim would run into the road and be hit by a car, hence the chain of causation would not be broken. The facts of Corbett are very close to the facts of this case, however there is a rather important difference. In Corbett there was no dangerously speeding car, the driver in Corbett, although overtaking another car, was acting lawfully and reasonably, hence within the range of forseeability. Whether it is equally foreseeable that a dangerously speeding car would be passing by on the road is a matter of fact for the jury to decide. For the unlawful act of driving dangerously to break the chain of causation there needs to be an informed, free and deliberate intervention, see Pagett [1983]. Whether such is the case seems highly unlikely, therefore I will progress on the basis that the chain of causation has yet to be broken.
The victim's parents refuse medical treatment on behalf of the victim due to their religious beliefs. Case law makes it clear that such refusal by the victim based on religious belief does not constitute a new intervening act, see R v Blaue [1975]. Of course the law is dynamic and may change, however the above case leads me to suggest that such refusal does not break the chain of causation.
Under section 8 of the Family Reform Act 1969 parents have the right to consent or withhold such consent to medical treatment on behalf of a minor. However, the parent's rights over their child are so granted so they may carry their duties in relation to the well being of their child, not for the benefit of the parent. Therefore if the victim, albeit a minor, is mature enough to understand the consequences of her decision, then her wishes may over rule those of her parents, see Gillick v West Norfolk [1985]. The fact's available do not state whether an assessment of the victim has been carried out to conclude whether she is Gillick competent. If such an assessment has not been carried out then the doctors' inaction may be considered as gross negligence and break the chain of causation. However, for the conduct of the doctors to break the chain of causation it must be established whether the injury is a substantial and operating cause of the victim's death, or whether the action or omission of the doctors is of such a nature as to constitute a completely new act or omission, see R v Smith [1959]. To establish whether the injury is a substantial and operating cause the 'but for' test may be used, in other words, but for my client's action would have the victim died, or was the original injury only a setting which is so overwhelmed by a second cause as to make my clients action part of history, see R v White [1910].
Based on these two tests, it may fairly safely be suggested that the doctors have not broken the chain of causation. However the facts available do not state whether the injuries caused by my client were so minor as to only make my client's action part of history. These two tests may also be relevant in relation to the dangerously speeding car in so far as the speeding car is considered to be unforeseeable rather that a natural consequence of my client's action.
To conclude therefore, there are a number of matters of fact for the jury regarding the chain of causation. If it is found that the chain of causation is broken then my client may be charged with causing grievous bodily harm without intent contrary to section 20 of the OAPA 1861. If he is found guilty of GBH without intent, the maximum would be five years, however the fact that my client is a minor would be taken into consideration. The most likely charge however is manslaughter. The sentence for manslaughter varies depending on the circumstances of the case. However based on the facts available it may be suggested that the sentence would be around the low end.
